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Abstract 
The theoretical assumptions of deliberative democracy are increasingly embraced by 
policy makers investing in democratic deliberative practices, often without adequate 
empirical verification. One such assertion concerns the stimulus of social learning among 
participants of civic democratic deliberation. Through the innovative use of a quasi-
experimental design, it is tested if – and among whom – participation in mini-publics 
stimulates social learning. In terms of whom, this analysis demonstrates higher social 
learning according to education level. The results inform a richer theory on the impacts 
of deliberation, as well as better use of limited resources for deliberative practice. 
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Introduction 
The central question this research wants to explore is if – and if so, among whom – 
participation in civic democratic deliberation stimulates social learning. 
This research objective is based on the assumption that democratic deliberation 
strengthens public reason (Chappell, 2012; Christiano, 1997; Fishkin, 1997; Habermas, 
1996; Mill, 1948; Pateman, 1975; Valadez, 2001) and particularly stimulates social 
learning (Barraclough, 2013; Dryzek, 2006; Park, 2000; Welton, 2001). Deliberators 
would learn from each other other’s insights and experiences, which would result in a 
greater understanding and appreciation of opposing views (Barraclough, 2013). However, 
we still lack accurate empirical data on the phenomenon of democratic deliberation for 
this – theoretically assumed – claim to be – empirically – valid. Empirical research on 
democratic deliberation rarely explores social learning thoroughly. And where this has 
been the case, researchers have been dependent on the indirect measurement of  
participants' self-assessment of social learning (Grönlund, Herne, & Setälä, 2017; 
Hansen, 2004; Luskin, O'Flynn, Fishkin, & Russell, 2014; Michels & De Graaf, 
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2010; Price & Cappella, 2002) or informal deliberation (Park, 2000), or on the 
measurement of social learning in digressive behavior (Grönlund et al., 2017). 
Moreover, there is barely something known on the impact of the self-selection effect 
on the deliberative effect (cf. who takes part in a citizens’ budget?).  
Through the innovative use of a quasi-experimental design, in which the investigation 
of social learning is directly approached and crucial citizens’ features are taken into 
account, this project will adequately be able to go beyond the rather broad existing 
causal questions in the field. Hence, the overall relevance of this work lies in the 
objective to significantly improve existing democratic theory with in-depth empirical 
data. Hence, despite the theoretical trend in scaling up deliberative democracy, we still 
lack accurate empirical data on the phenomenon of democratic deliberation. 
Furthermore, since ordinary citizens and governments are extensively investing in 
the practical implementation of deliberative practices, it is as well of much practical 
relevance to contribute to insights on the efficiency of those investments, from a 
public-spirited perspective of citizenship – assumed in this research.  
The essence of this research concerns a definite empirical investigation of the effect of 
deliberative practices. Practices which cannot be detached from the normative arguments 
on which they are based, but which can never fully reach the requirements political 
theorists aim for. One should note that there is no consensus in the literature on the 
normative – procedural nor outcome – requirements to which deliberative democracy has 
to answer. However, that is beside the point in this work. A research that (merely) aims 
at gathering empirical knowledge on the effect of democratic deliberative practices (not 
at the falsification of deliberative democracy as a theoretical model), does not require 
normative consensus, nor an ideal type of deliberation. It does need a core normative 
basis, but it has to leave open the different empirical, institutional conditions through 
which this normative basis of democratic deliberation can be fulfilled (Chappell, 2012).  
The notion of ‘deliberative mini-publics’ is broadly used in the literature to outline a 
general framework for civic deliberation1 and will therefore be used as conceptualization 
of deliberative democracy in this work. This notion defines the forums organized by 
policy-makers in which citizens who represent different viewpoints are gathered together 
                                                          
1 In what follows we will often refer to ‘deliberation’ whereas systematically ‘democratic deliberation’ is meant. 
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to moderately deliberate on a particular issue in small groups (Brown, 2006; Fung, 2003; 
Goodin & Dryzek, 2006; Setälä & Herne, 2014). 
In the first part of this article, we will synthetize the literature in the field out of which 
three hypotheses follow, we will test in this study. In this first part we will also explain 
how we approach social learning – the central dependent variable in this work. In the 
second part we will point out the methods used to test our hypotheses. In the penultimate 
part, we will present the results as answers on the hypotheses. In the concluding part, we 
will come back to the most important empirical insights of our analysis and we will 
reflect on their implications for the academic and societal field; two terrains wherein 
democratic deliberation emerges ever more empathically . 
 
1. Literature Review & Hypotheses 
 
1.1. Social Learning & Citizenship 
Three incentives for policy-makers to engage citizens in their decision-making, in 
between elections (participation in the invited space), can be extracted out of the 
literature: ‘because they have to’ (juridical argument), ‘because it ought to be’ (moral 
argument) and ‘because it is worth it’ (Fung, 2003). The latest refers to the quality of 
decisions (‘better decisions’), the legitimacy of the decisions (‘better support’) and social 
learning (‘better citizens’). It is that final benefit that civic deliberation in particular 
assumes to stimulate (Barraclough, 2013; Dryzek, 2006; Park, 2000; Welton, 2001). In 
this work we endorse Barraclough’s (2013) definition of social learning as civic 
deliberators who learn from each other’s insights and experiences, which results in a 
greater understanding and appreciation of opposing views2.  
This interpretation of social learning has to be framed within the implicit assumption of 
the importance of public reason, on which this research is based3. If democracy is about 
the debate on the decisions which mostly benefit society, then it is our duty being citizens 
(of whom the interests are assumed to be served by our representatives) to think about 
what we think is good for the society as a whole and to act upon it (read: to cast our vote 
accordingly. If policy has to serve society in the end, then the representation of the simple 
                                                          
2 The interpretation of ‘empathy’ in Grönlund, Herne & Setala (2017) matches for a great part with the 
conceptualization of social learning (cf. infra).  
3 Cf. Rawls’ (1971) ‘duty of civility’ and Arendt’s (1967) ‘representative thinking’ or ‘enlarged mindedness’. 
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sum of individual interest is not only morally counterintuitive, but also materially 
inefficient. Seen from this perspective, social learning is of crucial importance. To be able 
to deliberately choose for a policy whereby the society as a whole is benefitted, it is 
essential to understand and appreciate the perspectives of those who do not share our 
background, environment or experiences.  
For the concrete conceptualization of this notion, we adapt Park’s (2000) classification of 
what he labels in his deliberative democratic research as ‘civility’: one’s understanding 
of why others think the way they do. Even though this definition consist of a pure 
cognitive approach (in contrast with our more broad interpretation of social learning that 
also refers to the appreciation of opposing views), he conceptualizes his notion along 
different axes, of which we reconcile the cognitive and attitudinal in this work4 (cf. 
diagram 1). 
Dia 1. Conceptualisation of social learning 
Social learning =  learning from each other’s insights and experiences  
 understanding and appreciating opposing views 
Cognitive: learning to understand other’s views and to make their own views 
understandable for others 
Attitudinal: learning to transcend the perspective of the personal environment  
 
Understanding other’s views as an indicator of social learning (cognitive), does not 
merely imply that people are conscious of what other people think. The ‘understanding’ 
factor indicates reference to learning why other people think the way they do (Siu, 2008). 
A necessary precondition for deliberators to be able to learn about the reasoned arguments 
of others, is that deliberators are able to make themselves understandable for others 
(cognitive). This has also to be seen as a – softer – indicator of social learning. Indeed, 
being able to explain why you hold a particular position implies an (implicit) 
understanding that others do not necessarily share your background or world, or are 
otherwise different. Learning to transcend the perspective of the personal environment 
                                                          
4 The complete conceptualization also consists of a ‘behaviour’-indicator: learning to show understanding for other 
opinions, actually making the own opinion understandable for others and appreciating other perspectives. However, 
this indicator is not studied in this (but in following) publication(s). 
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(attitudinal), subsequently, is about taking the consciousness of these differences (in 
meaning, social position, needs) into account (Janssens & Steyaert, 2001). 
1.2. Empirical Fuzziness about the Deliberative Effect 
Democratic theorists argue that deliberation is good for democracy, as a process (e.g. 
rendering decision-making more legitimate) and/or an outcome (e.g. producing better 
decisions or citizens). Concerning the latter, democratic theorists generally make the 
claim of the transformative power of deliberation (Steiner, Bächtiger, Spörndli, & 
Steenbergen, 2004). The reflective aspect of deliberation is claimed to be crucial: 
deliberative reflection would have the potential to transform preferences/interests/beliefs 
in a normative welcome way (Chappell, 2012; Dryzek, 2000; Stokes, 1999; Valadez, 
2001). More specifically, the deliberative process, contrarily to the way citizen 
participation in representative democracies is organized, would have the potential to go 
beyond the mere aggregation of individual interest (Leyenaar, 2007). Some make the 
claim that there would be a reinforcement of the willingness to take the arguments of 
other people into account (Christiano, 1997; Fishkin, 1997), while others even assume 
that deliberation would strengthen the commitment to the common good (Chappell, 2012; 
Habermas, 1996; Mill, 1948; Pateman, 1975; Valadez, 2001). 
Some democratic theorists borrow the term of social learning from social psychological 
theories to formalize the public-spirited transformative effect of deliberation (Dryzek, 
2006; Kanra, 2012; Welton, 2001). Barraclough (2013) argues that participation in 
deliberative processes opens up the opportunity for learning from each other’s insights 
and experiences – as a part or a result of the process – which results in a greater 
understanding and appreciation of opposing views. What makes an opinion deliberative, 
is that it has grasped and taken into consideration the opposing view of others (Park, 
2000).  
However, based on the current state of the art of the empirical research on democratic 
deliberation, we cannot – empirically – validate the latest-mentioned – theoretically 
assumed – deliberative effect. Previous empirical research concluded that 
deliberation creates more single-peaked preferences (Farrar et al., 2010), that it acts 
as a buffer against more negative feelings towards the out-group (Caluwaerts & 
Reuchamps, 2014) and that it makes people more thoughtful (Grönlund, Bachtiger, 
& Setälä, 2014; Smets & Isernia, 2014). Other conclusions have been that 
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deliberation stimulates mutual understanding of conflicting viewpoints (Andersen & 
Hansen, 2007; Hansen, 2004; Luskin et al., 2014). It has also been derived from 
earlier research that deliberation leads to a greater cosmopolitan and collective 
orientation of preferences (Gastil, Bacci, & Dollinger, 2010), as well as to preferences 
that are more environmentally friendly (Fishkin, 1997). 
All of these conclusions are in line with the transformative character argued for and 
assumed by deliberative theorists. However, there has been disproportionally less 
attention given to the more profound relationship between social learning and deliberative 
democracy in empirical research than this has been the case in democratic theory.  
Social learning implies more than merely developing empathy as the understanding of 
opposing views (Andersen & Hansen, 2007; Hansen, 2004; Luskin et al., 2014). Social 
learning also presumes that one learns to take other visions into account. This is as well 
not necessarily implied when deliberation appears to greaten the expression of 
preferences towards ‘the common good’ (Fishkin, 1997; Gastil et al., 2010), which just 
as well can be guided by a mere personal consideration. Moreover, from the state of the 
art it is to be derived that empirical research in which social learning is approached as a 
key dependent variable, researchers have been largely dependent on participants’ self-
assessment of the perception of an evolution in social learning (Michels & De Graaf, 
2010; Price & Cappella, 2002), on the evolution of participants’ self-assessment of the 
willingness to consider other views and the measurement of digressive behavior 
(Andersen & Hansen, 2007; Grönlund et al., 2017; Hansen, 2004; Luskin et al., 2014), or 
even on the self-assessment of deliberation as ‘the frequency of political conversations 
people think they have with those with whom they disagree’ (Park, 2000). This means 
that up until today, we still lack studies in which the assumed deliberative effect on social 
learning is directly and formally approached. This makes the empirical validity of the far-
reaching claim on social learning still unclear. 
In the meantime, the importance of taking the perspectives of others with a different 
background, environment or experience into account, is mounting in societal debate. 
More and more, the moral and material desirability of citizens (read: consumers) who 
vote – in a democracy – for a party because they assume they will lower their taxes or 
make their recently bought solar panels economically cost-effective, is put into question. 
In such a political context, the societal importance of social learning is considerably 
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rising. From this point of view, policy makers are increasingly inspired by the persuasive 
theoretical assumption that democratic deliberation stimulates social learning. 
Given its reasonable theoretical explanation and some meaningful empirical indications 
in previous research, we could expect that deliberation actually stimulates social learning. 
H1: Participation in mini-publics stimulates social learning among deliberators. 
The objective of this research is, however, not limited to the contribution of empirical 
knowledge on the mere outcome of deliberative practices. This work is also characterized 
by the ambition to discover some meaningful insights on the explanation of the measured 
deliberative outcome. At present day, researchers are therefore still explicitly stressing 
the need to come to a deeper understanding of the deliberative outcomes (Setälä & Herne, 
2014). Generally, empiricists forgot to turn the page and consequently ignored the effect 
of the individual features of civic deliberators.  
The self-selection thesis, which opposes the socialization thesis, assumes that political 
participation is driven by the intrinsic presence of certain norms of citizenship (Baum, 
2015; Uhlaner, 2001). This theory presupposes that the engagement in political 
participation is driven by the calculation of the returns on investment (of time and energy). 
Citizens who have the experience, network, skills or trust to participate will be more 
inclined to see the benefits of participation and thus to actually grasp these opportunities.  
Specifically, this self-selection thesis supposes that the socio-economic situation is 
crucial in forecasting political participation (Baum, 2015; Uhlaner, 2001). Because of a 
higher political knowledge, trust and interest, it assumes that higher-educated citizens will 
be more inclined to participate to deliberative democratic processes in the invited space. 
Because of the glass ceiling, the opposite would hold for women (in opposition to men). 
The little empirical research on individual features of civic deliberators, confirms this 
assumption (McNulty, 2015).  
 
Hence, if we assume that deliberation mainly attracts ‘politically favorable citizens’, the 
question rises to what extent this interacts with the actual deliberation and it outcomes. If 
we a) suppose that deliberation stimulates social learning among its participating citizens, 
but b) also assume that those citizens hold some – politically crucial – distinct features, 
then the question is if those features are necessary for the deliberative effect on social 
learning to come about? Even if the opposite could also hold (that the deliberative effect 
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is precisely greater among those who do not already hold politically crucial features), we 
can reasonably assume  the following:  
 
H2.1:   Men learn more socially than women through participation in mini-publics 
H2.2:  Higher-educated learn more socially than lower-educated through participation 
in mini-publics  
     
2. Methods 
Because we are dealing with a complex political phenomenon (Eckstein, 1975), of which 
the empirical aspects are still left unchartered (Ragin, 1987), and in which we want to test 
a causal assumption (Abelson et al., 2003), we argue that the case study is the most 
accurate method to address our research objective. This means that – theoretically – we 
rein in external validity. However, one has to notice that in the current context in which 
deliberative democratic experiments in practice take on so many distinct forms (topic, 
decision-making, length, role of moderator/experts) and the impact of those conditions is 
still unknown, external validity is by definition unachievable. However, this does not 
mean that one cannot strive to validate the institutional context.  
In contrast with many other experiments in the field, we study a  real-world deliberative 
practice. More specifically we selected the case of the participatory budgeting program 
of Antwerp District, the largest and most central district of the municipality of Antwerp 
(Belgium’s most populous city). Antwerpian districts enjoy a directly-elected sub-local 
council and dispose over those – constrained – powers that concern the citizens’ most 
direct living environment (streets, public squares, green spaces, culture, sports, 
communication, targeting youth and seniors). Since 2014 Antwerp District has yearly set 
up forums in three different phases in which a diverse group of citizens5 moderately 
deliberates in small groups on the spending of €1.1m (10% of district council spending). 
With the Antwerpian case, we study the prevalent (urban) practice of citizens’ budgets as 
mini-publics. These practices – opposed to other real-world deliberations – are not 
characterized by specific policy questions, nor distorted by ruling political power 
                                                          
5 Participation is open to every district inhabitant, which in the first edition of the program led to a rather traditional 
participatory public. By focusing on informing and inspiring hard-to-reach citizens (youngsters, people with a 
migration background), the organization now succeeds in achieving a remarkable diverse group of participants (cf. 
92% of the participants agreed that a diversity of opinions was represented at the tables).  
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relations – dependent on the particular case at hand. Citizens’ budgets are characterized 
by an universal setting in which a mini-public can independently decide on politically 
allocated money. Furthermore, with the Antwerpian case, we selected a case of which the 
particular decision-making procedure, role of moderators and length has been copied in 
foreign cities and municipalities. In that way, we argue that the Antwerpian Citizens’ 
Budget opens up the opportunity to maximize the internal and external validity within our 
case study research.   
Contrary to traditional cross-sectional research, we developed a design that allows us to 
test causal relations accurately. This research is based on unique panel data of the 
participants of the Antwerpian Citizens’ Budget 2017 before and after their participation 
in a respective phase of the deliberative process. This one group pretest posttest design 
allows us to analyze the evolution in social learning for each individual. Hence, we 
measured the upper-mentioned indicators of social learning (cognitive and attitudinal) 
through a pre-/post survey, of which the answers were coded qualitatively6 and the results 
analyzed quantitatively.   
More specifically, we asked the respondents (before and after every phase of the 
trajectory) to which of the topics7 they would certainly want to spend money on. The 
answer on this is not as such of much relevance for this research, but acted as a cue for 
the sequential questions. Hence, we subsequently asked for (all of) the (specific) reasons 
for their choice. This survey design has been successfully introduced by Cappela et al. 
(2002), in research on the impact of informal deliberation on one’s argumentation for the 
choice of this or that presidential candidate.  
In contrast with the research of Cappela et al. (2002), the amount of given arguments is 
of no relevance in this research. Our data-analysis focusses on the content of the given 
arguments. In that way we can study if respondents are able to think of understandable 
arguments for their own position (cognitive),  if they either or not transcend the personal 
environment (attitudinal), and the respective pre/post evolution in this. If one offers either 
few or many arguments, does as such tell us nothing about the comprehensibility or public 
reason of those arguments.  
                                                          
6 To become maximum consistency on the (pre- vs. post-)coding, one coder coded all answer. Afterwards, 30% of the 
answers were recoded by a second coder. Krippendorff’s alpha measured both for the own argumentation and for the 
argumentation of others .74. 
7 In the second phase we explicitly asked which of the at the first phase selected themes one preferred. 
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For the coding of these arguments, a coding scheme has been developed based on the 
Discourse Quality Index (DQI) (Steiner et al., 2004). Since the DQI is not to be seen as a 
method to measure argumentation, but is used as an index to analyze reported 
argumentation, we argue that it is a well-founded8 instrument to apply on either form of 
deliberative argumentation; whether it has been reported before, during or after 
deliberation, as an answer subsequently to explicit questions or not. Since the index has 
been initially developed for parliamentary deliberation, it is common to adapt the index 
for use for civic deliberation (Steffensmeier & Schenck-Hamlin, 2008). More 
specifically, it is desirably to focus not only on ‘arguments’, but also on narratives and 
reasons (e.g. personal stories and anecdotes).  
In this way, these elements of the DQI which are relevant according to the dependent 
variable in question – the level of justification (inferior, qualified, sophisticated) and the 
content of justifications (neutral, group interests, common good)  –, have been updated to 
the particular context of this research. Specifically, we made the distinction between 
unqualified (no reasons or only reasons without a clear linkage with the opinion), 
qualified (at least one reason with a clear linkage with the opinion – cf. cognitive) and 
qualified public argumentations (at least one reason with a clear linkage with the opinion 
whereby an individual or particular group context is being transcended – cf. attitude).  
Hence, we can explore social learning by studying the pre-post evolution of the coded 
argumentation (cf. table 1). When an argument becomes ‘public (qualified)’ or 
‘qualified’, social learning has taken place. In the first case, the respondent shows having 
learnt to transcend the personal environment. This can concern both an evolution of a 
(non-public) qualified, as a unqualified pre-argumentation. In the second case, the 
respondent shows having learnt to think of understandable arguments for one’s own 
argumentation, the more soft form of social learning (‘+’ instead of ‘+ +’). The latest can 
only concern unqualified pre-argumentations that evolve to (non-public) qualified post-
argumentations.  
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Yet unconventional.  
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Table 1. Summary individual evolution own argumentation 
 
Next to the argumentation of the own opinion, we also asked for potential opposing 
opinions, as measurement for the second – stronger – cognitive indicator of social 
learning. By analogy with the above mentioned survey design of Cappela et al. (2002), 
participants were asked for specific reasons vis-à-vis their proper reported priority other 
citizens could have not to spend money on it. These answers were coded in compliance 
with the own argumentation as described above: qualified vs. unqualified argumentation. 
An evolution from a pre-unqualified to a post-qualified argumentation shows that 
respondents learnt to understand other’s views (cf. table 2).  
In this chapter we focus on the survey results of the first and second phase of the Citizens’ 
Budget of 20179. 
Of the 175 civic deliberators of the first phase and the 102 of the second, respectively 77 
(phase 1) and 36 (phase 2) have completed both the pre- as the post-survey10. Hence, we 
become reliable response rates of respectively 46% and 35%. Since a lot of the non-
response concerns dropout after the pre-surveys, we have considerable proportions of 
                                                          
9 The third and final phase is not incorporated in our analysis since the response rate at this phase was too low to achieve 
valid results (9%). The fact that this response rate is much lower than at phase 1 and 2 (whereas the same technique 
and strategy vis-à-vis similar – and often also the same – respondents was used) is remarkable. We get back to this in 
the discussion part.  
10 Of whom 32 participants at the first phase and 23 at the second phase completed the pre-survey online. Every other 
pre-survey was completed physically on site, every post-survey online. The social learners (cf. infra) who completed 
the pre-survey physically are overrepresented at phase 1 (with regard to the social learners who completed the pre-
survey online), whereas they are precisely – similarly strongly – underrepresented at phase 2. Hence, we conclude that 
there is no net-effect of the way (physically or online) the (pre-)survey was completed. One has to remark that we did 
not opt to let participants fill in the post-survey on site. Seen the nature of the questions, we argue that answers in such 
a context would be contaminated by mere memory (instead of knowledge). Seen the quasi-experimental set-up of this 
study it is, however, important to collect the post-results relatively quick after the end of the deliberation (because of 
contamination by other post-processes or –events). Hence, by means of clear communication and fast follow-up, we 
succeeded in receiving 58% of the post-results (phase 1 and 2) within the day after the deliberation. Answers which we 
received after more than 5 days, were no longer registered. 
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socio-demographic information of the total population at our disposal (80% of all 
participants in phase 1, 44% in phase 2). Hence, if we compare the sub-samples response 
(pre and post) vs. non-response (pre only) on gender, age and education, then we notice 
no statistical differences11. This means that the respondents of which we have the data to 
analyze their social learning, do not differ from these civic deliberators who do not appear 
in our analysis. This means that there is no reasons to presume that these other deliberators 
learnt differently, which preserves the internal validity of our results. 
Table 2. Summary individual evolution argumentation of others
 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1. Does it work? 
Firstly, we ascertain that regarding the argumentation of the own opinion, the vast 
majority of participants already had a qualified opinion at the beginning of the 
deliberation: 67% at the start of phase 1, 78% before phase 2. At the beginning of the first 
phase, more than one third of these already reported a qualified public argument (25%). 
At the start of phase 2, this public variant concerned more than half of the qualified 
arguments (42%).  
Figures 1 & 2 show the result of the comparison – for each respondent – between that 
pre-argumentation and the reported argumentation after the respective first and second 
phase of the Citizens’ Budget. When an argument becomes ‘public (qualified)’ or 
‘qualified’, social learning has taken place (cf. table 1).  
 
                                                          
11 Based on a paired samples test. 
13 
 
Fig. 1.  Phase 1: individual evolution own argumentation (N = 64) 
 
 
The first and second phase show a similar, positive effect of social learning. After the first 
phase we see an effect of social learning among 27% of the respondents: 13% shows a 
qualified argumentation whereas they did not have this at their disposal before the 
deliberation, among 14%, the post-argumentation shows an evolution to a (qualified) 
public character. At the end of the second phase we found that 36% of the respondents 
demonstrates – based on the argumentation for the own opinion – to have learnt socially. 
Among 7% there is an evolution to a qualified argumentation, among 29%, there is an 
evolution to a (qualified) public argument – the stronger indicator of social learning.  
Moreover one has to notice that the vast majority of the respondents who have not been 
categorized as having learnt socially, already had a qualified argumentation at the start 
and were able to maintain this level of argumentation (53% in phase 1, 46% in phase 2).  
More than one third in phase 1 (19%) and more than half among them in phase 2 (25%) 
even possessed a qualified public argument at the start. In other words, these respondents 
were not able to learn socially. However, they succeeded in maintaining this type of 
argumentation. That they – because they did not evolve – are resorted within the rest 
group of non-learners, enforces the positive effect of social learning when it comes to the 
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argument of the own opinion. Furthermore, we ascertain only a – in relation with the 
upper mentioned positive effect – limited negative effect (11% at phase 1, 14% at phase 
2); in casu respondents of whom the public qualified pre-argumentation evolved to a mere 
qualified post-argumentation (‘becomes private’), or of whom the (mere) qualified pre-
argumentation became an unqualified post-argumentation (‘becomes unqualified’).  
Fig. 2. Phase 2: individual evolution own argumentation (N = 28) 
 
Secondly, corresponding the reported argumentation regarding the opinion of others (who 
would not want to finance the concerned priority), we found out that three quart of those 
arguments were unqualified at the beginning of the Citizens’ Budget: 74% at phase 1, 
77% at phase 2. In other words: contrarily regarding the own opinion, only few 
respondents were able to give concrete reasons why others would not want to finance 
their priority before the start of the deliberation.  
Figures 3 shows the results of the comparison – for each respondents between this pre-
argumentation and the reported argument at the end of the respective first and second 
phase of the Citizens’ Budget.  
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Fig. 3. Phase 1 & 2: individual evolution argumentation of others 
 
Again we discovered a similar, positive evolution in social learning in the first and second 
phase. After the first phase, we detected an effect on social learning among 21% of the 
respondents, after the second phase, this is the case among 22% of the respondents. This 
means that more than one out of five respondents were not able to give concrete reasons 
why other citizens would not support the same priority at the outset, but were capable of 
doing so after the deliberation.  
Furthermore, one has to remark that 3 respondents (6%) subsequently to the first phase12, 
and no one succeeding the second phase reported no (concrete) reasons where they have 
been able to do so at the respective starts of the phases. This implies that a part of the 
status quo group, concerns respondents who maintained their qualitative pre-
argumentation. So, hereby it goes as well that they (since they did not evolve) were not 
labeled as social learners and thus enforce the positive effect on social learning.  
Finally, we discovered that all respondents – but two (in phase 2) – who learnt socially 
regarding the argumentation for the own opinion (in phase 1 or 2), differed from those 
who learnt socially on the argumentation of the opinion of others. In that way, we can 
                                                          
12 A possible explanation is that respondents did less effort for the post-survey (cf. survey fatigue due to identical 
questions in a short time frame. 
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conclude that 48%13 of the respondents learnt socially in phase 1, and 51%14 in phase 2. 
These learners were both in phase 1 and 2 proportionally spread out over the distinct 
meetings in the respective phases15.   
At first sight, this latest empirical conclusion seems counterintuitive; how can you learn 
to know the arguments that oppose your own opinion (social learning on the argument of 
others), without also having learnt arguments that support the own position (social 
learning on own opinion)? Above, however, we mentioned that there has been a ‘positive 
status quo group’ regarding the argumentation of the own opinion. Hence, we ascertained 
that the social learners regarding the argument of the opinion of others, were respondents 
who already possessed and maintained a qualified (public) argumentation for the own 
position (except the two respondents who both learnt on the argumentation of others as 
of their own).  
With the conclusion that about half of the participants learnt socially, the results of this 
case study suggest the confirmation of H1. It is not unimportant to stress hereby that this 
number is not the result of mainly low social learning (cf. own argumentation becomes 
qualified). The positive evolution correspondent for 73% in phase 116 and for 88% in 
phase 217 with learning to understand the meaning of others (cf. argumentation of the 
position of others becomes qualified) and to transcend the personal environment (cf. own 
argumentation becomes public) – the stronger indicators of social learning.  
3.2. Among whom?  
Next we wish to find out under which conditions this effect of social learning takes place. 
Therefore we will focus in what follows on two central individual conditions in political 
participation: gender and education.   
The participants were approximately equally distributed regarding gender and education. 
In phase 1 participants consisted by 46% out of women and 46% out of low educated18. 
In phase 2 these numbers were respectively 48% and 44%. It has to be remarked that these 
                                                          
13 27% + 21% 
14 36% + 15% [(4 (new social learners on a total of 6)/N=27) = 15] 
15 All of the 8 encounters within the first phase represented at least 7% of the social learners. At phase 2, 57% of the 
social learners deliberated at the first encounter on Saturday, 43% deliberated at the second encounter on Sunday.  
16 [21% (qualified evolution regarding the opinion of others) + 14% (public evolution regarding the own opinion)] / 
[21% + 14% + 13% (qualified evolution regarding the own opinion)]. 
17 [22% (qualified evolution regarding the opinion of others) + 29% (public evolution regarding the own opinion)] / 
[22% + 29% + 7% (qualified evolution regarding the own opinion)]. 
18 High educated vs. maximum secondary education. 
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numbers are quite high in comparison with other deliberative and – more generally – 
participative trajectories. Often, the vast majority of participants are highly educated and 
manly. In this way, this case opens up as an opportunity to establish internal valid results 
on these crucial individual conditions.  
When we compare all the participants who learnt socially in phase 1 or 2 with those who 
did not learn in the respective phases, then we ascertain no statistical differences on 
gender (N = 140, phi = .023, p > .05), nor on education19 (N = 137, phi = .052, p > .05). 
However, if we compare the stronger forms of social learning (own argumentation 
becomes public, argumentation of others become qualified) with the softer form (own 
argumentation becomes qualified), then we do discover statistical differences on 
education (N = 44, p < .05). The significance of this effect disappears when we compare 
the stronger forms of social learning with all those wo did not learn strongly, nor softly 
socially. 
This analysis does not lead in the direction of H2.1, but it does suggests the confirmation 
of H2.2: we concluded that you do not have a greater chance of higher social learning 
being highly educated or manly, but that if you learn socially, you do have a greater 
chance of learning more thoroughly from the insights and experiences of others when 
being highly educated.  
  
4. Conclusion & Discussion 
In this article we answered the causal question if participation in democratic deliberation 
stimulates social learning – among whom? Based on a reiteration of the three central 
empirical conclusion of this quasi-experimental study of the case of the Antwerpian 
Citizens’ Budget, we explain in this concluding part, the scientific and societal relevance 
of this work.  
Through a comparison of pre- and post-survey data, we concluded in the first place hat 
approximately one third of the participants were able to give concrete reasons for their 
own opinion at the end of the deliberation, where they were not capable of doing so 
                                                          
19 Every time a participant learnt or did not learn socially (own argumentation, argumentation others – phase 1, phase 
2), his or her gender or education level was taken into account (instead of ending up with a less accurate comparison 
of heterogeneous groups of respondents that learnt socially on the own or the other’s argumentation versus those who 
did not at all learnt socially). We exclude the positive status quo group from the non-social learners, since they could 
not learn socially due to a priori high social learning indicators (cf. infra).  
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beforehand (27% at phase 1, 36% at phase 2). Moreover, most of them transcended the 
personal environment in giving these concrete post-reasons, where they did not so at the 
start of the deliberation.  
Furthermore we ascertained that the most participants already were able to give concrete 
reasons for their own position at the start and were capable of maintaining this way of 
reasoning. For a significant part of these participants (19% at phase 1 and 25% at phase 
2), these concrete reasons already had a public character (whereby the personal 
environment was transcended). In other words, these participants could not learn socially, 
but they succeed in maintaining this type of reasoning. However, because this does not 
concern an evolution, they were not categorized as social learners. This reinforces the 
positive effect of social learning on the argumentation of the own opinion.  
Secondly, we concluded that participants afterwards were better capable of giving reasons 
why others would have a different opinion. One out of five respondents were able to 
report concrete reasons why others would not agree with the concerned respondent’s own 
opinion, where they could not report this beforehand (21% at phase 1, 22% at phase 2). 
Again, it is the case that a part of the group that was not labeled as social learners are 
concerning participants who beforehand already reported concrete reasons for another 
opinion and repeated this afterwards. This conclusion – derived from direct measurements 
– confirms the formerly assessed evolution of participants’ self-assessment of the 
willingness to consider other views (Andersen & Hansen, 2007; Grönlund et al., 2017; 
Hansen, 2004; Luskin et al., 2014).  
This strongly positive relationship between deliberation and social learning is confirmed 
by two additional observations. It follows from our analysis that the two upper-mentioned 
groups of social learners (those who learnt on the own argument, those who learnt on the 
argument of others) consist exclusively of different participants – let alone two 
participants at phase 2. Concretely, this means that not less than half of the participants 
of the Antwerpian Citizens’ Budget, learnt socially (48% at phase 1, 51% at phase 2). 
Furthermore, we ascertained that the strongest ways of social learning took place. Citizens 
not only learnt to argue for their own opinion (the softer indicator of social learning), but 
they predominantly transcended their own environment in doing so, as well as were able 
to reason from another environment out of which they delivered concrete reasons against 
their own position.  
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The fact that these evolutions de facto occurred through respective deliberations of an 
hour and a half, additionally appears to confirm the theoretical assumption of the 
deliberative effect on social learning. Moreover, these micro-level insights indicates 
direction to the systemic turn.  One has to remark that because of the large-scale size and 
strength of the effect, the absence of a control group is de facto neutralized. Indeed, 
nothing indicates that non-participating citizens learnt socially to the same extent between 
a regular Sunday afternoon and a blue Monday morning20. Also, that the mere pre-
surveying of argumentation would have as such a strong social learning effect, is difficult 
to explain. Definitely vis-à-vis a subsequent debate in which the exchange of arguments 
is central in the decision-making. However, when the sample size is sufficiently great, it 
can be a suggestion for further research to explore the panel conditioning effect of the 
research design at hand.   
Mini-publics are more topical than ever and are not rarely justified by their presumed 
effect on social learning. In this way this research suggest that the rising investments in 
deliberative democratic experiments are desirable – in light of the importance of public 
reason in citizenship.  
Nevertheless one has to handle the conclusion of this research carefully. This study 
concerns the first empirical data on the deliberative effect on social learning in which the 
variables are respectively directly and formally measured. Although we obtained an 
internally valid measuring instrument with the use of an innovated quasi-experimental 
set-up, the number of participants was relatively limited. In other words, we have to await 
to what extent further research (to most similar cases) confirms the results of this study.  
However, we selected a case which – because of its common participatory budgeting 
setting, its context of a diverse city, its decision-making model that has been copied and 
implemented abroad – tells us more than merely something about an evolution among 
citizens in a Belgian city.  
In addition, we wish to stress again that since our response rate at the final phase was too 
low (9%), the final phase has not been incorporated in our analysis21. At the same time, 
we used the same questioning technique and strategy vis-à-vis similar – and often also 
the same – participants. At this phase, in which the funding of concrete projects is at stake, 
                                                          
20 Indication of the time in which the pre- and post-surveys were completed (cf. footnote 6: 58% of the post-results 
were received within the day after the deliberation). 
21 Cf. footnote 5.  
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participants reported on site that they ‘have no time to complete the survey’ since they 
wanted ‘to use the time before the start of the deliberation to campaign for their own 
project’ and ‘to search for allies’. This suggests that the context of this third phase is less 
favourable for evolutions in social learning. A qualitative subsequent analysis of the 
respective actual deliberations (in which the final phase is incorporated), can clarify this 
matter. 
One has to remark that we approached phase 1 and 2 as if they were separated independent 
variables.  However, in practice there is overlap between the two phases: more than half 
of the participants of phase 2, participated as well in phase 1. Nevertheless, further 
analysis demonstrated that previous participation (at a previous edition or in the previous 
phase), or former social learning (in a previous phase)  had no (positive, nor negative) 
effect on the evolution in social learning. Since this analysis is based on a small N (a 
sample from a sample from a relative small population), further research is needed to 
confirm this conclusion. This may learn us more on the temporality and specificity of the 
effect on social learning.  Does the effect of social learning only concerns the deliberative 
issues? Or those these – and other – effects (also) play on other fields and on the longer 
term? 
The third and last central empirical conclusion raised more specifically from the empirical 
illiteracy on the impact of the influence of the self-selection effect on the deliberative 
effect. Our analysis showed that not all citizens are equally susceptible to social learning 
through participation in democratic deliberation; not men, but high educated 
demonstrated higher social learning. Whereas high and low educated people have an 
equal chance of learning socially, our results do indicate that it is being highly educated 
that makes one more favourable to learn to understand other opinions and to transcend 
the perspective of the personal environment, instead of merely learning to reason for one’s 
own opinion. Qualitative research on the respondents’ deliberative experiences should 
offer an explanation of this phenomenon.    
If further research would confirm this result, then the question raises if and how 
deliberation can lead to more inclusive social learning. How do we make sure that 
citizens of whom the participation to deliberation is less evident, have equal chances to 
develop as more fortunate citizens? A concern inherently connected with the public-
spirited perspective of citizenship, from where this research started. 
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